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Henri Bortoft (1938–2012)
We devote much of this issue to physicist, philosopher, and science educator Henri Bortoft, who died
on December 29, 2012, at his home in England. He
was 73 years old. Throughout the years, we have
covered Bortoft‘s work in EAP because it speaks to
a particular mode of environmental encounter that
might be called a ―phenomenology of the natural
world.‖ His best known writing is the influential
Wholeness of Nature, published in 1996. His last
work, released shortly before his death, is Taking
Appearance Seriously (see EAP, winter 2013).
In the early 1960s, Bortoft worked with British
philosopher J. G. Bennett on the development of
―systematics‖—a method of encountering and understanding whereby one might explore the various
aspects of a phenomenon through the qualitative
significance of number. Doing his doctoral research,
Bortoft worked with British physicist David Bohm
to consider the relationship between quantum mechanics and an understanding of wholeness.
In later professional life, Bortoft was invited by
biologist Brian Goodwin to teach in the innovative
graduate program in holistic science at Schumacher
College, in Totnes, UK. There and elsewhere, many
students were deeply touched by Bortoft‘s singular
instructional style whereby he introduced the phenomenological approach phenomenologically.
Bortoft‘s work is central to EAP because he presents an empathetic way of
encountering phenomena
whereby they ―reveal‖
themselves in an accurate
and comprehensive way.
One of his most important
models for seeing and understanding was Goethe‘s
ISSN: 1083-9194
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way of science, which Bortoft recast as a ―phenomenology and hermeneutics of nature.‖ He would
regularly repeat Goethe‘s dictum, ―One instance is
often worth a thousand, bearing all within itself.‖
In this issue of EAP, we include two tributes—
the first by EAP Editor David Seamon, who studied
with Bortoft in the early 1970s; the second, by philosopher Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, who has discussed Bortoft‘s work in articles and books. We also reprint two of Bortoft‘s writings: first, a portion
of his 1971 article on authentic wholeness; and, second, a 2011 article Bortoft wrote for the Journal of
Holistic Science, published by Schumacher College
and Earthscan. We thank his widow, Jackie
Bortoft, for allowing us to include this work here.
Also in this issue is an update from Torontoian
Robert Fabian, who describes his recent citizen
involvement with development along downtown
Toronto‘s Yonge Street. We end with a cartoon envisioned by designer J. Kevin Byrne.
Below: A drawing from Edwin Abbott Abbott’s 1884 Flatland—one of Henri Bortoft‘s favorite examples to illustrate
that the world we take for granted may have unsuspected, new
aspects. ―Flatland‖ refers to an imaginary world of two dimensions inhabited by various geometric creatures like squares
and hexagons. An important part of the story is the appearance
of a ―Sphere‖ from the realm of three dimensions, who the
Flatlanders can only understand as a point and expanding and
contracting circles. See Bortoft‘s account, p. 13.
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Edited by a philosopher and anthropologist, this volume is ―an
interdisciplinary collection of essays that merges architectural
theory and urban design with philosophy, religion, humanism,
and environmental policy to present an alternative vision of
urban life.‖ Contributors include W.S.K. Cameron (―Can
Cities Be Both Natural and Successful?‖); Bruce Foltz (―Nature and City in the Greek East‖); Ken Maly (―Biocracy in the
City: A Contemporary Buddhist Practice‖); Trish
Glazebrook (―Ecofeminist ‗Cityzenry‘‖); David Seamon
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Items of Interest
The 44th annual meeting of the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) will be held in
Providence, Rhode Island, May 29–June 1, 2013.
EAP is sponsoring one symposium, ―Conceptual
Issues in Place Research: Concerns, Prospects, and
Points of Contention.‖ Presenters include Maria
Lewicka, Faculty of Psychology, University of
Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland (―Being or Becoming:
What Do Relations between People and Places Tell
Us about the Meaning of Place?‖); and EAP Editor
David Seamon (―Place as Human-Immersion-inWorld: How to Describe the Lived Wholeness of
Place Phenomenologically without Breaking it into
Arbitrary or Reductive Parts?‖). www.edra.org/.

Phillip Vannini, ed., 2009. The Cultures of
Alternative Mobilities. Burlington: Ashgate.
This volume‘s 16 chapters, edited by an anthropologist, focus
on current mobility experiences. Essay titles include: ―The
Sociability of the Railway Journey‖ (D. Bissell); ―The Cultural Geography of Flight‖ (L. Budd); ―The Making of Mundane
Bus Journeys‖ (J. Jain); ―Mobility in Later Life‖ (L. Levin).

Jeremy C. Wells & Elizabeth D. Baldwin,
2012. “Historic Preservation, Significance,
and Age Value: A Comparative Phenomenology of Historic Charleston and the Nearby New-Urbanist Community of I’On.” Journal of Environmental Psychology, vol. 32,
pp. 384–400.

The 32nd annual International Human Science Research Conference will be held August 13–16,
2013, at Aalborg University, in Aalborg, Denmark.
Psychotherapist Linda Finlay and EAP Editor David Seamon are organizing a symposium, ―Engaging Relational Encounters: Silences, Clients, Places
and Art Works.‖ Besides Seamon and Finlay, presenters include philosopher Robert Mugerauer and
psychologist Eva Simms. www.ihsrc.aau.dk/

Using interviews and photo elicitation techniques, this study
concludes that residents of historic Charleston and the nearby
New-Urbanist community of I‘On ―value their environments
in remarkably similar ways. Surprisingly, elements that evoke
a strong sense of attachment tend to be landscape features
such as gates, fountains, trees, and gardens rather than buildings. The informants valued the ‗mystery‘ that they felt was
part of the landscape and which consisted of layered elements
such as fences, gates, and paths, such that these features (including buildings) had to be discovered. Lastly the informants
strongly valued landscapes that showed ‗people care‘ through
regular maintenance. The essential difference in people‘s experience and valuation of the new environment (I‘On) and the
old environment (historic Charleston) is the older environment‘s ability to instill creative fantasies in the minds of the
informants based on a hypothetical past of their own creation.
The informants in I‘On did not share these kinds of meanings.‖

Citations Received
Iris Aravot & Eran Neuman, eds., 2011. ArchiPhen: Some Approaches and Interpretations of Phenomenology in Architecture.
This volume includes 18 conference presentations from the
first ―Architecture and Phenomenology‖ conference in Haifa,
Israel, in May, 2007. Contributors include: Iris Aravot; Jim
Baek; Benoit Jacquet; Eran Neuman; and Nili Portugali.
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Henri Bortoft (1938–2012)
Encountering the Whole
David Seamon

I

n 1972–73, I was a graduate student living in
England and had the unexpected opportunity
to participate in a seminar on ―The Hermeneutics of Science‖ taught by Henri Bortoft.
This learning experience had a profound impact
on how I understood myself personally and professionally. Through both the style and content of his
teaching, Henri demonstrated that there was another
way of understanding that was more open and intensive than the arbitrary, piecemeal mode of knowing presupposed by conventional undergraduate and
graduate education.
Henri‘s primary teaching vehicle was Goethean
science, which he introduced through a series of doit-yourself perceptual exercises laid out by Goethe
in his Theory of Colors (1810). I still have the notes
in which I copied the key questions that Henri had
us keep in mind as we looked at and attempted to
see color phenomena:










What do I see?
What is happening?
What is this saying?
How is this coming to be?
What belongs together?
What remains apart?
How does this belong together with itself?
Is it itself?
Can I read this in itself?

Henri played a major role in directing my future
academic life: an interest in phenomenology and the
particular mode of phenomenological understanding
offered by Goethe‘s unique approach to looking and
seeing. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Henri would
write a series of essays on the nature of authentic
wholeness. These essays would eventually become
the chapters of his extraordinarily creative The
Wholeness of Nature, published in 1996.
To me, this book is one of the great, unheralded
works of our time—perhaps arriving too soon for
many people to understand. But I believe firmly that

this work is a harbinger of a new way of engaging with
the world that will grow in intensity and significance
as the 21st century unfolds.
As we typically are, we don‘t fully encounter the
world or the things, places, and living beings in it.
Henri taught a way of seeing that graciously meets
with the ―Other.‘ In allowing the Other to become more
and more present and dimensioned, this method of
knowing not only deepens our sensibilities but facilitates an emotional bond of wonderment and concern.
We see more and, though that understanding, may better care for our world.
One of Henri‘s earliest portraits of this mode of
seeing and learning is his 1971 essay, ―The Whole:
Counterfeit and Authentic,‖ published in British philosopher J. G. Bennett‘s quarterly journal, Systematics
[see pp. 6–11]. There, Henri wrote:
We cannot know the whole in the way in which we know things
because we cannot recognize the whole as a thing. If the whole
were available to be recognized in the same way as we recognize
the things that surround us, then the whole would be counted
among these things as one of them. So we could point and say
‗here is this‘ and ‗there is that‘ and ‗that‘s the whole over there‘.
If we could do this, we would know the whole in the same
way we know its parts, for the whole itself would simply be numbered among its parts, so that the whole would be outside its parts
in just the same way that each part is outside all the other parts…
But the whole comes into presence within its parts, so we
cannot encounter the whole in the same way we encounter the
parts. Thus we cannot know the whole in the way we know things
and recognize ourselves knowing things. So we should not think
of the whole as if it were a thing…, for in so doing, we effectively
deny the whole inasmuch as we are making as if to externalize
that which can presence only within the things that are external
with respect to our awareness of them (vol. 9, no. 2, p. 56).

In her apocryphal 1969 novel, The Four-Gated
City, British-African writer Doris Lessing defined love
as the ―delicate but total acknowledgement of what is.‖
This description encapsulates the heart of Henri‘s masterful work.
David Seamon is the Editor of EAP.
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Henri Bortoft
Philosophy as Lived
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic

M

ecological health risks and loss of sense of place are
increasingly prevalent and where academics have a
responsibility to contribute, beyond the comfort of
their discipline, to solutions to these problems.
My first encounter with Bortoft‘s writings was
his 1985 article, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes:
Finding a Means for Dwelling in Nature‖ [1]. To my
mind, this article remains one of the best introductions to hermeneutics, phenomenology, and holism.
Within philosophical circles, there have been
important critiques of holism. For instance, in The
Case for Animal Rights, ethicist Tom Regan claims
that environmental holism is necessarily ―ecofascism‖ because individuals, such as animals, are
sacrificed to an omnipotent whole, such as an ecosystem [2]. Bortoft, however, demonstrates that authentic holistic thinking has nothing to do with creating a
dominant ―super-part‖ to rule over individual components sacrificed for the good of the whole. On the
contrary, by brilliantly contrasting the image of a
hologram with an ordinary photographic plate, he
shows how the ―whole‖ is properly reflected in the
―parts.‖ He writes:

ore than a decade ago, while an Associate Chair in Philosophy at the University of Toronto, I encountered in the
elevator a colleague who had just returned from teaching his first class in our introductory, first-year course. He proudly declared that he had
managed to ―chase away a good third of the class.‖
He explained that he only wanted to retain students
determined to be philosophy specialists.
My jaw dropped as he left the elevator. In my
Associate-Chair capacity of what was then the largest
philosophy department in North America, I still
hoped our professional aim was to attract and retain
students in our programs. But, beyond those administrative musings, I was appalled that my colleague envisioned philosophy as a discipline only for ―specialists.‖ My view is that philosophical questions are important to everyone, whether or not one chooses dedication to academic study. In fact, to be human is to
naturally reflect upon philosophical questions.
This colleague retired shortly thereafter but
many philosophers still think as he did, and many
journals—even those focusing on interdisciplinary
environmental ethics—provide opportunities for philosophers to debate exclusively among themselves.
Few academics possess the talent to communicate
beyond the discipline in a way that preserves the academic integrity of ideas while making them accessible to a broader audience.

If the hologram plate is broken into fragments and one fragment
is illuminated, it is found that the same three-dimensional optical reconstruction of the original object is produced. There is
nothing missing: the only difference is that the reconstruction is
less well defined…. The entire picture is wholly present in each
part of the plate, so that it would not be true in this case to say
that the whole is made up of parts… On the contrary, because
the whole is in some way reflected in the parts, it is to be encountered by going further into the parts instead of by standing
back from them [3].

H

enri Bortoft was the very opposite of my philosophy colleague. He was the quintessential
teacher, able to straddle physics, philosophy
and the study of the environment. Brilliantly adept at
taking complex philosophical ideas about hermeneutics and holism and translating them, without loss, to
non-philosophers, he was able to make these ideas
legible and exciting. This talent is especially important in the environmental field, where issues such
as pollution, climate change, declining biodiversity,

What a lucid example to show how holistic
thinking is more than merely additive! Bortoft suggests a different kind of understanding that preserves
the interaction and relation between whole and parts.
He then makes links to hermeneutics and to the act of
grasping meaning in a text. He speaks of a fundamen-
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tal distinction between the whole and the totality.
When we read a text, for example,

The Wholeness of Nature is a powerful book that
speaks for itself, and I invite readers to read this important work that can dramatically shift one‘s understanding of understanding. Also significant is his recently published Taking Appearance Seriously: The
Dynamic Way of Seeing in Goethe and European
Thought, which continues to reflect upon phenomenology, hermeneutics, and a new vision of science.
Here we read how ―phenomenology seems to take the
ground away from under our feet, whilst at the same
time, gives us the sense of being where we have always been—only now recognizing it as if for the first
time‖ [7]. Interestingly, this description of phenomenology actually captures the essence of Bortoft‘s own
reflections, which make us aware, as if for the first
time, of so much of what we take for granted about
our relation to the natural world.

we do not have to store up what is read until it is all collected
together, whereupon we suddenly see the meaning all at once, in
an instant… We reach the meaning of the sentence through
reading the words, yet the meaning of the words in that sentence
is determined by the meaning of the sentence as a whole…. We
can say that meaning is hologrammatical [4].

W

hy do these ideas matter to the study of
environment? They are important, first,
because we realize how describing holistic
phenomena, such as a sense of place, means more
than only describing its component parts or even
compiling an inventory of these component parts. To
think holistically is to think in an essentially nonreductionist, non-calculative manner. It is to move
beyond the study of delimited things, uncovering the
ontological condition of the possibility of the meaning that is revealed in the relation between things, in
the essence of the individual things themselves, and
in the taken-for-granted context and interpretive horizon within which things appear in the first place.
The challenges of such holistic thinking are
huge: If Bortoft is right (as I think that he is), then
thinking holistically about problems of urban planning or global climate change means developing new
research approaches and study methods. This new
way of thinking means that, in addition to complex
engineering or Newtonian scientific models, we need
to draw on a wider range of sources. Besides climate
change science, for instance, we need to reflect on
climate ethics and critically evaluate value systems
sustaining particular calculative worldviews.
From Bortoft‘s perspective, we need to rethink
the way we do science in the first place. In this connection, he turned to Goethe‘s method of ―delicate
empiricism‖ for guidance. In The Wholeness of Nature, Bortoft explains how we must move beyond the
―organizing idea‖ of ―naïve empiricism‖ or ―factism‖
which assumes that facts are ―independent of an ideational element‖ [5]. Drawing from Goethe‘s ―whole
way of seeing‖ the unity of the phenomenon, he introduces a new way of scientific thinking to supplement mainstream science—an approach that points
toward a ―radical change in our awareness of the relationship between nature and ourselves‖ [6].

H

enri Bortoft has left a significant legacy that
enriches the phenomenological literature and
reflects a profound and unique understanding
of the meaning of holism. He is a thinker whose writings will continue to have impact for a long time to
come. His was a life well lived and his accomplishments deserve to be preserved and celebrated.

Notes
1. H. Bortoft, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a
Means for Dwelling in Nature,‖ in D. Seamon & R.
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, pp. 281–302; the article was
reprinted in D. Seamon & A. Zajonc, eds., Goethe‘s Way of
Science, Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1998,
pp. 277–98. Though in slightly different form, the article also appears as part I of Bortoft‘s The Wholeness of Nature:
Goethe‘s Way toward a Science of Conscious Participation
in Nature, Hudson, NY: Lindesfarne Press, 1996, pp. 1–16.
2. T. Reagan, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 2004.
3. Bortoft, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes,‖ in Dwelling,
Place and Environment, p. 282–84.
4. Ibid, pp. 284–85.
5. H. Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature, p. 144.
6. Ibid.
7. H. Bortoft, Taking Appearance Seriously, Edinburgh, UK:
Floris Books, 2012, p. 17.
Stefanovic is a Professor of Philosophy and former Director of
the Centre for Environment at the University of Toronto. Her
most recent book is The Natural City (Univ. of Toronto Press,
2012), co-edited with Stephen Bede Scharper (see p. 2).
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The Whole: Counterfeit and Authentic
(selected passages)
Henri Bortoft
This text originally appeared as ―The Whole: Counterfeit and Authentic,‖ published in Systematics, vol. 9, no.
2 (September 1971), pp. 43–73. The sections reprinted here are from pp. 54–57 and pp. 59–64. In the early
1980s, EAP Editor David Seamon asked Bortoft to revise this 1971 article for a volume he was editing with philosopher Robert Mugerauer. This revision included Bortoft‘s first discussion of Goethean science and was published as ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding Means for Dwelling in Nature,‖ in D. Seamon and R.
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 281–302. We thank
Jackie Bortoft and Ben Bennett for permission to republish portions of the original article here.

T

he way the whole emerges is by coming
into presence within parts. The whole
comes to presence part-ially because it is
within parts, and it is by im-part-ation, by
coming into presence within parts, that the whole
can be whole. The whole is imparted in that it is
present within parts, which thus become its parts
and cease to be just bits and pieces. It is by impartation as a coming into presence within its parts that
the whole holds to its essence.
The whole cannot come out without ceasing to
be whole and becoming all and everything, falling
into the plural totality of identity in difference. For
then the whole would become the object (ob-ject:
that which is thrown out) which is the collection of
objects, and so cease to be authentically whole.
Thus it is essential that the whole comes into presence within parts, so that the whole presences within its parts.
This tells us something fundamental about the
whole in a way that shows us the significance of the
parts. If the whole presences within its parts, then a
part is a place for the presencing of the whole. If a
part is to be an arena in which the whole can be present, it cannot be any old thing. Parts are not bits
and pieces because a part is only a part if it is such
that it can bear the whole.
There is a useful ambivalence here: ‗to bear‘
in the sense of ‗to pass through‘ and ‗to carry‘: and
‗to bear‘ in the sense of ‗to suffer‘, where this is
taken in the sense of ‗to undergo‘. By itself the part

is nothing, not even a part. But the whole cannot be
whole without the part. The part becomes significant
itself through becoming a bearer of the whole.
A part is special, not accidental because it must be
such as to let the whole come into presence. This speciality of the part is particularly important because it
shows us the way to the whole. It clearly indicates that
the way to the whole is into and through the parts. The
whole is nowhere to be encountered except in the
midst of the parts. It is not to be encountered by stepping back to take an overview, for it is not over and
above the parts, as if it were some superior overarching part. The whole is to be encountered by stepping right into the parts. This is how we enter into the
nesting of the whole and thus move into the whole as
we pass through the parts.

T

his dual movement, into the whole through the
parts, is demonstrated clearly in the experiences
of speaking and reading, listening, and writing.
We can see that, in each case, there is a dual movement: We move through the parts to enter into and under the whole that presences within the parts. When we
understand, both movements come together. When we
do not understand, we merely pass along the parts.
For example, let us consider the interpretation of a
difficult text. At first encounter, we just pass along the
parts, reading the words without understanding. To
come to understand the text, we have to enter into it,
and this we do in the first place by sounding out the
words. We enter into the text as the medium of mean-
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ing through the words themselves, not by referring
the words to some other external text placed in a
superior position of authority in interpretation. We
put ourselves into the text in a way that makes us
available to meaning.
This hermeneutic approach is the antithesis of
an analysis that stands back to look upon the text as
an object to be separated into parts. Analyzing into
parts is a way of refusing to enter the parts. Entering
into the parts is an approach into a work that is
working, and not a retreat to an object of analytical
knowledge. The whole is nowhere to be encountered except in the midst of the parts; it is here that
meaning is to be encountered as a transforming
presence. It is not to be encountered by stepping
back to take an overview, for it is not over and
above the parts like some superior over-arching
part. The whole is to be encountered only by stepping right into the parts.

of this same origin, the ‗I‘ that knows is outside of itself, for it can know itself in self-awareness.
Awareness is occupied with things. It is in the
knowing of things that the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘ becomes
self-aware, and hence it is in this knowing that we find
ourselves in the world. Looked at from the side of
things, which is where we stand in self-awareness, the
whole is absent. The whole is absent to awareness because it is not a thing among other things.

I

t is for this reason that the whole is easily forgotten, after which its presence is unsuspected. What
stands before us is the parts, and it is in standing
before the parts that we recognize ourselves. But the
whole does not stand before us; we are not its spectator. Since the whole comes into presence within its
parts and not outside of them, the whole is quite unthinglike or un-partlike (think of the difference between the meaning of a sentence vs. the meaning of a
word in that sentence). Thus, from the side of awareness, the whole is a no-thing.
To awareness, no-thing is nothing. This must be
so, since awareness is awareness of something. But it is
here that we have a choice, and it is a fateful choice.
Since no-thing and nothing cannot be distinguished
within awareness, the whole that is no-thing can be
taken as a mere nothing, in which case it vanishes in
the forgetfulness of awareness. When this happens, we
are left with a world of things alone and the apparent
task of putting them together to make a whole.
This taking of the whole that is no-thing to be
mere nothing is the origin of nihilism. We can say that
the essence of nihilism is that it takes nothing to be
nothing and, having already prepared the ground for
this, we can see immediately the deep truth of this apparent triviality.
It is a startling consequence of the origin of nihilism in the forgetful vanishing of the whole into mere
nothing, that all efforts at integration and synthesis are
inherently nihilistic. This must be so, since the attempt
to build the whole from the side of separate things reinforces the forgetful vanishing of the whole. Such efforts disregard the authentic whole. But it is in just this
way that the counterfeit wholes of science, technology,
and the whole of contemporary culture are produced.

E

verything we encounter in the world can be
said to be either one thing or another, either
this or that, either before or after, and so on.
Wherever we look, there are different things to be
distinguished from one another: this book here, that
pen there, the table underneath, and so on. Glancing
about, we recognize a multitude of different things,
side by side, laid out in mutual self-distinction.
Each is outside each other, and thus all are separate
each from every other.
But in recognizing the things about us in this
way we, too, by this recognition, are separate from
and outside each of the things we recognize. Thus
we find ourselves in recognition laid out side by
side, together with and separate from, the things we
recognize.
This is the familiar spectator awareness. In the
moment of recognizing a thing, we stand outside of
that thing and, in the moment of so standing outside
of that thing, we turn outside into an ‗I‘ that knows
the thing, for there cannot be an ‗outside‘ without
the distinction of something being outside of some
other thing.
Thus the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘ arises in the knowing
of something in the moment of recognition of the
thing known. By virtue of its origin, the ‗I‘ that
knows is outside of what it knows. Also, by virtue
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T

he other side of the choice is to take the
whole to be no-thing but not nothing. This is
difficult for awareness, which cannot distinguish no-thing from nothing. Yet we have an illustration immediately at hand with the experience of
reading. We do not take the meaning of a sentence
to be a word. The meaning of a sentence is no-word.
But evidently this is not the same as nothing, for if
it were we could never read!
The whole presences within parts. From the
standpoint of the awareness that grasps the external
parts, however, the whole is an absence. But it can
be an active absence inasmuch as we do not try to
be aware of the whole as if we could grasp it like a
part, but instead let ourselves be open to be moved
by the whole.
Inasmuch as we do not try to be actively aware
of the whole, so equally we will not be self-aware.
Our active awareness will be taken up with the
parts, and we will be aware of ourselves there with
the parts. But we will not be aware of ourselves being moved by an active absence, not aware in the
sense of the self-awareness of the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘.
The first step into the wholesome encounter
comes when ‗I‘ is absent, or occupied with things,
so that the whole that is an absence with respect to
awareness comes into presence. We do not notice
this peculiar non-aware sensitivity to the active absence. We do not notice it because we are identified
with the ‗I‘ of awareness, and hence we are dependent upon things and think that presence is merely a
matter of location of manifestation. But this sensitivity to the active absence accompanies the ordinary awareness that eclipses it, and this sensitivity
can be developed.
There are many hermeneutic illustrations of the
active absence—for example, watching a play, playing a game, reading, writing, and speaking—that are
similar to the case of the actor playing his part in
the play. These experiences can each demonstrate
the reversal that comes in turning from subjective
awareness into the wholesome encounter. This turning around, from grasping to being grasped, from
awareness of an object to letting an absence be active, from ‗I‘ to the whole, is a reversal that is the
first practical consequence of choosing the path that

assents to the whole as no-thing and not mere nothing.

I

t is just because of this very reversal that the whole
must be invisible to the scientific approach as currently conceived. The paradigm for modern scientific method is Kant‘s ―appointed judge who compels
the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself
formulated.‖
Science believes itself to be objective, but it is in
essence subjective because the witness is compelled to
answer questions that the scientist himself has formulated. The direction is from the scientist as origin to an
object of enquiry that reflects back what the scientist
takes to be an answer.
In this way, the scientist believes that he comes to
know the unknown. He never notices the delusion that
consists in his trying to go from the known to the unknown, and thus attempting to treat the unknown as if
it were a kind of known. He never notices this because
he believes he hears the voice of ‗nature‘ speaking, not
realizing that it is the transposed echo of his own
voice. The scientist certainly gives ‗nature‘ the last
word, but only after he himself has had the first word.
Thus modern science can only approach the whole
as if it were a thing among things. It must try to grasp
the whole as its object for interrogation. Trapped in
subjective awareness, it cannot understand that the authentic direction of discovery is from the unknown to
the known, because this direction is not open to the
awareness that holds onto things. This direction becomes possible only with the turning around that lets
the whole—which is absent with respect to awareness—be active.
So it is that science today is, by virtue of the
method that is its hallmark, left with a broken world of
things that it must thus seek to reassemble. Science has
great need for the whole, but by virtue of its own nature, it must exclude the whole. Thus science must
build counterfeits by introducing connections, interactions, and relations into the world of things. All such
attempts ultimately fail because they are based in ignorance on the condition that is left when the whole has
vanished into mere nothing.

T

he consequences of the whole as mere nothing
are illustrated in the attempts of science to establish connections. The essence of connection
is separation because, when a connection is made to
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overcome a separation, the ground of the connection
is to overcome a separation. Thus establishing the
connection essentially affirms the separation.
It is no accident that the mathematical method
is so useful in the attempt to build counterfeits for
the whole. The core of modern mathematics is the
axiomatic method, which means starting with a set
(the ideal representative of nihilism) and defining
operations upon the members of that set to produce
patterns of relationships.
It is this axiomatic method that has now become the very archetype of method in our metaphysical-scientific-technological civilization, and as
such it has become ubiquitous. For example, management attempts to organize and develop business
and industrial structures by introducing connections
between supposedly separate elements that have
been pre-defined.
Consequently, we should not imagine that the
subjectivity of science, the loss of the whole, and
the endeavor to provide counterfeits in ignorance of
this loss are limited to physics or chemistry. On the
contrary, this is a foundational condition of all
forms of thinking currently available to Western
peoples, including ‗new‘ forms of thought such as
systems thinking and structural thinking—which are
not new in any way whatsoever.

I

t is not a matter of finding new concepts for the
whole. For where there is a concept, there is an
idea; and where there is an idea, there is an object of thought that represents something from
which it is quite separate. Hence, there is separation
and awareness, and the whole is lost.
The encounter with the whole cannot be understood conceptually. We need a non-conceptual
thinking of the whole, and this means that we would
not easily be able to recognize it as thinking. This is
because such thinking would be non-metaphysical,
and all thinking of knowledge in science and technology is fundamentally metaphysical (Heidegger:
―metaphysics is only the ontology of knowledge‖).
It is not a matter of giving up metaphysics in a futile
attempt to retreat, but of going through metaphysics
and beyond to a thinking which is quite other. It is
what begins to happen with the turning around into
the whole.

The turning around into the whole begins with the
development of a sensitivity to the active absence, the
development of an openness that lets the whole come
to be, not as an object that stands over against us in
localized manifestation, but as a presence that emerges
globally so that we find ourselves everywhere within
it. It is as if we become the object for the whole that
can never be our object.
This possibility seems strange because this is how
the entry into the wholesome encounter seems from the
side of the awareness of things. It is just because there
is no place for the whole among the things as objects
of awareness that the inversion that the wholesome encounter constitutes with respect to awareness seems so
unthinkable.

W

e can help to mitigate this strangeness by
exploring a practical case where the way
into the wholesome encounter seems to be
blocked. An excellent opportunity is provided by the
sense of having failed to understand something through
becoming overcome by detail. When this happens we
say that we ―can‘t see the wood for the trees.‖ This
saying has the advantage that it is literally as well as
figuratively true.
Let us first explore the literal case. Standing in a
wood, surrounded by individual trees, we tell ourselves
that we can‘t see the wood for the trees. This carries
the implication that it is possible to see the wood, but
something is getting in the way, namely the trees. Consequently we must introduce a distance between ourselves and the trees by changing our position and walking out of the wood.
Crossing the boundary from inside to outside constitutes a standing back from the wood, but we still fail
to see anything but trees. If we could climb a convenient hill or hire a helicopter, we could perhaps find a
position from which to observe the totality of the trees
enclosed within their own tree boundary. From such a
vantage point, we would seem to be able to see all of
the trees taken together, although we would not see all
of each individual tree. We would have an object before us that we could see and know that we were seeing. We could then point and say ―There‘s the wood,‖
and we could do this because we are separated from
the totality of trees, standing over against them as a
collected unit.
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But what is this collected unit but the totality of
trees! We would still see nothing but trees, just the
same as when we were inside the wood and complained that the trees impaired our vision of the
wood itself. The only difference is that from our
vantage point outside the wood, we would be able
to see the totality of the trees and not just a few.
This view, however, would be achieved with
considerable loss in richness of concrete detail. The
totality over against which we stood would be a
poorer object to see compared to what could be seen
inside the wood, but it would be no more than more
of the same trees. The attempt to encounter the
wood by distancing from it results in seeing it as no
more than the set of objects called trees, so that
―wood‖ is no more than a class name. This is the
nihilistic external wood. We might even call it the
axiomatic or mathematical wood—let the wood W
be a set of trees, T1, T2, T3… Tn. But it is not the living wood.
Let us consider what happens if we move back
toward the wood. What happens when we cross the
boundary to enter into the wood? The only difference
is that we would be surrounded by trees instead of
having them collected together in a unit standing over
against us in one direction only. There would be no
fundamental change in what is seen (although there
would be an increased richness of detail) because we
would continue to see individual trees before us as
separate, countable objects.
In this sense, there is no fundamental difference
between being inside or outside the wood. This distinction does not mark a discontinuity in experience,
but merely a relative transposition of orientation.
Since there is no perceptual change when we are
inside, it is the same as being outside, and vice versa.
So it really does look as if ―wood‖ is no more than a
class name.

B

ut this is all no more than how it is for the
observer awareness, which grasps things as
objects for the self-reflective ‗I‘ to claim to
see and know. This indifference between inside and
outside is characteristic of the awareness of things,
and it fades away as we enter into the wholesome
encounter. It is important to stress that, for the observer awareness of things, there is no difference
between being inside or outside of the wood because,

upon entering a wood, we all sense that there is a difference but may not notice that this sense does not come
immediately from what we can see and know.
Rather, the sense of difference between inside and
outside comes from the active absence, which is the way
through which we begin to participate in the presence of
the wood. There is an entry into the wood that sacrifices
self-centered awareness and instead lets the wood be. To
the degree that this happens, we find ourselves being
met by the wood—not just individual trees in their places, but the sense of a ubiquitous presence coming toward
us.
This is so different to seeing the trees that we can
begin to sense that ‗wood‘ does have a significance in
itself, not as an object but as that which presences
through the trees. The first encounter is like bursting
through a bubble into a living presence that implodes
upon us and is ‗there‘ but nowhere, often seeming to be
more real than we are to ourselves.
This is how we begin to participate in a presence
sensed as an active absence that is distinctly different
from the standing-back awareness of individual trees as
things. This is how we begin to enter into ‗the within‘ of
the wood, which is quite distinct from the inside that is
the same as the outside. The within of the wood is more
immediate than the inside of the wood because the inside is already outside.
The sensitivity to the wood as an active absence is
unfortunately often lost through degeneration into sentimentality, ‗nice‘ feelings, and silly remarks about how
lovely everything is. It is by this degeneration that the
subjective awareness slyly tries to grasp for itself what
can never belong to it.
This is possibly the reason why we look upon such
experiences as pleasing but merely subjective and not to
be taken seriously—an ironic situation because this
sensitivity is in fact the beginning of truly objective
experience, as distinct from the subjectively ―objective‖
experience of the awareness and knowledge of things. A
further reason for doubting the authenticity of such experiences is that the perception cannot be verified in the
way in which it can with the awareness of things, and it
is just this thing-based verifiability that constitutes our
familiar, but nihilistic, criterion for reality.

I

mportantly for our purposes here, the turning
around into the wood can go further than the development of a sensitivity to the active absence. It
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may not often do so but is always possible. There are
discrete stages of the turning around, each of which is
a quite different mode of encounter with the whole,
and each of which is stepped into through a discontinuity.
The first authentic stage of the wholesome encounter is the becoming sensitive to the active absence, but it is inherent to this stage that it is not
easily recognized for what it is.
This stage reaches its limit with the sense of implosion—of an invisible presence coming toward us.
This stage goes no further, but it is just at this point
that a discontinuity can occur and a further stage of
the wholesome encounter can be entered, a stage that
is a deeper turning around into the whole marked by
an instantaneous reversal from the experience of
seeing to the experience of being seen. It is quite
distinct and unmistakable: it is not a matter of ‗as if
we were being seen‘ but the actual experience of
being seen.
In this mode of sensitivity, the wood is no longer
an active absence. Rather, we now encounter the
wood face-to-face, but in a way that is inside-out
with respect to our awareness of the things around us.
We experience ourselves being looked at, being
watched from every direction at once, so that the
wood implodes upon us, and we experience ourselves
being seen by the whole wood.
It is when this happens that we can truly say we
are within the wood, and that the wood is the living
whole and not just the totality of the set of trees. We
cannot go out to the whole to know it because we
would have to go in every way all at once. But the
whole can come to us because every direction can
implode upon us.
This is the radical reversal that marks the second
stage of the turning around into the whole. So we can
never see the wood, only the trees. The wood is invisible to our seeing, but we can be seen by the wood
and experience ourselves being seen by the wood. It
is in this respect that we can encounter the wood,
which sees us through the trees. In this way, we find
that seeing is far more than only a property of the
subjective human being.

in the arrogance of subjective awareness, we approach
nature as dumb and stupid, as something that needs to be
re-arranged, harnessed, and put to good use by us, whom
we imagine to be the possessors and sole bearers of
intelligence.
But the turning around into the whole demonstrates
that nature should be entered into watchfully with care.
It shows that watchfulness is essential in that nature is a
living presence that can communicate with us if we can
turn around into the right condition for being spoken to
and hearing ourselves being spoken to.

Bortoft on phenomenology
[Phenomenology] refers to… a movement of thinking in which
the position of attention is shifted from what appears (downstream) into the occurring of what occurs (upstream). In particular, it is concerned with the happening of appearing—with appearance (read verbally)—so that phenomenology is concerned
with what appears in its appearing….
Clearly, there cannot be any separation between the happening of appearing and what appears—i.e., there could not be ‗appearing‘ without ‗something‘ appearing. But our attention is usually drawn to what appears to such an extent that we miss the
happening of appearing. In fact, although it clearly makes no
sense to try to think of appearance without something thus appearing, we almost invariably do think of what appears without
noticing its appearance.
As we explore the shift in attention that this requires, to catch
what appears in the appearing, we find ourselves in a position
where familiar patterns of thought that we take for granted no
longer apply. When we focus in the usual way on what appears, it
seems just natural to say ‗it appears‘. But when our attention
shifts upstream into what appears in its appearing, then it becomes awkward to say ‗it appears‘ because the very form of this
leads us to think of an ‗it‘ that ‗appears‘. This encourages us to
think of ‗it‘ as being there already, and then appearing.
But this gets it back to front, by imagining ‗it‘ as if it had already appeared before it ‗appears‘! We would do better to say
‗appears it‘. This may be bad grammar, but it is better philosophically because now ‗it‘ emerges for the first time in its appearing,
and so this avoids the mistake of separating ‗it‘ from ‗appearing‘
as if appearing is something that happens to ‗it‘ subsequently.
This further implies that appearing is contingent to ‗it‘, in the
sense of being something that sometimes happens to it but need
not necessarily do so. Directing our attention into the movement
of thinking in this way, enables us to see clearly the difference
between ‗it appears‘ and ‗appears it‘, and to recognize that the
self-contradictory character of the former encourages us to get
everything the wrong way round.

T

he wholesome encounter brings about a radical transformation in our attitude to the natural environment and the biosphere. Standing

—from Taking Appearance Seriously (Edinburgh: Floris Books,
2012), pp. 95–96
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T

he practical value of paradox is that it can
be a doorway to new perceptions. To
think of paradox as a sign of failure or as
only an intellectual puzzle greatly underestimates its real significance. Through paradox, our
coarse perceptions and understandings can be transformed into something finer and more subtle.
I was first introduced to this possibility in the
1960s by the philosopher J. G. Bennett, for whom
the attempt to hold opposites together—that is, not
oscillating from one to the other—was a key to the
transformation of psychological life to a greater degree of freedom in which real choice and action (instead of just reaction) becomes possible. Bennett
argued that we must try to hold ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ together simultaneously (for example, like and dislike, agreement and disagreement, and so forth) [1].
Bennett believed that paradox was not only
significant psychologically but was also important
in philosophical work, where it could lead to a less
coarse and more subtle form of understanding. He
pointed out that the basis of Jacob Boehme‘s
Realdialectik was his insight that ―In yes and no all
things consist‖—which should certainly not be reduced to ―all things consist of yes and no.‖ Bennett
thought that this was the real basis of Hegel‘s dialectic, and it is interesting that, in his lectures on the
history of philosophy, Hegel says that Boehme is
the true founder of modern philosophy, not Descartes. This made a deep impression on me at the
time, and it has greatly influenced my own work
and understanding ever since. I will try to provide
some explication of why.
One point that often strikes me is the importance of the distinction between passivity and
receptivity, and how often they are conflated. Ac-

tive and passive are clearly opposites, and we might
therefore be tempted to think in exclusive terms, as if
either we are active or we are passive. But being receptive is neither passive nor active in this either/or sense.
Rather, it is both active and passive at the same time.
Receptivity is a paradoxical state: When we are receptive, we are ―actively passive‖ and ―passively active.‖ It
is a more subtle or finer state than being active or passive. Yet these are both ―ingredients‖ in the state of receptivity but in a way that unites and transforms them.
This active/passive situation is a brilliant example of
what Hegel means by Aufhebung, a term that really has
no ready equivalent in English. If it were not for the
fact that we can have this experience of opposites together, we would never believe it [2].

U

nderstanding how the either/or of being active/passive can be transformed into being receptive is crucial for understanding Goethe‘s
way of science [3]. His practical way of proceeding is
designed to bring a person into a state of receptivity, so
that it becomes possible for the phenomenon to show
itself and ―be seen from itself in the very way in which
it shows itself from itself‖ [4]. But it‘s not just in Goethe‘s way of science that the ―paradoxical‖ state of receptivity is found. We see it also in the encounter with
meaning in hermeneutics where, as Simon Glendinning
explains, ―You have to let the text you are reading teach
you how to read it.‖
In the moment of understanding, there is a hermeneutic reversal where meaning becomes us (not becomes us)—i.e., we are becomed by the meaning. This
is the deeper dimension of phenomenology in which the
phenomenon is not only something that appears but appears as appearing. If we are not receptive, we can only
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encounter the phenomenon as what appears, and not
as the appearance of what appears [5].
The philosopher Mauro Carbone, commenting
on the later philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
drew attention to the need to go beyond the ―grasp‖
of the concept (in German the word for concept,
Begriff, carries with it the meaning ―grasp‖) to the
gesture of welcoming that receives something and is
more in tune with the Latin meaning of ―concept‖
(concipio—to be pregnant; to create a space for
something). Empiricism construes the concept as
passive, while idealism construes it as active.
Paradox is inevitable because, as Bergson
pointed out, ―the human intellect feels at home
among inanimate objects, more especially among
solids‖ so that ―our concepts have been formed on
the model of solids; our logic is pre-eminently, the
logic of solids.‖ The key characteristic of the
―world of bodies‖ is separateness, which means that
it is the world of independent entities self-enclosed
and external to one another. It is the quantitative
world because, as Aristotle argued, quantity is that
which has parts external to one another. I like the
image that the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin gave
of the situation when he said that the mind is basically at home in the world of medium-size dry
goods.
This is a very limited domain, and it is when
we try to fit things into this restricted framework
that we find ourselves confronted by paradox. This
does not mean that paradox is ―impossible,‖ ―mystical,‖ or just ―tiresome‖ (the British response).
What it means is that our thinking is too restricted,
and the form that the paradox takes will quite possibly give us some clue as to the way in which thinking needs to be transformed.

B

efore mentioning my own experience with
the idea of ―the one and the many,‖ I want
to highlight my favorite illustration: Edwin
Abbott‘s Flatland and the mysterious case of the
sphere [6]. Abbott‘s story concerns a society of
creatures entirely confined to a two-dimensional
surface, and what happens to one of them—a
square—when one day a sphere from the world of
three dimensions appears in his two-dimensional
world. The sphere passes through Flatland, but what
the hapless square experiences is that a point sud-

denly appears out of nowhere, turns into a circle of expanding diameter, reaches a maximum size, and then
begins to shrink back to a point and vanishes. He is
very puzzled, and when he says aloud to himself ―What
is this?‖ the sphere, who is not supposed to communicate with Flatlanders, announces, ―I am a sphere.‖
Of course, this information doesn‘t help the befuddled square at all. When the sphere tells the square that
he must go ―up,‖ the Flatlander has no such concept
and can only try to make sense of ―up‖ in terms of his
own familiar, but limited, experience. ―Do you mean go
‗north‘?‖ he asks the sphere, drawing on his knowledge
of two-dimensional mapping with a compass.
After struggling to get the square to understand the
paradox of ―go up, yet not north,‖ the sphere loses patience and casts the unprepared square out of Flatland
into the sphere‘s world of three dimensions. This shock
is too much for the square and ―blows his mind.‖ He is
eventually sent to an asylum where he joins other ―insane‖ Flatlanders muttering about a ―higher dimension‖
that every sane Flatlander knows doesn‘t exist.
n the world of bodies, ―one‖ and ―many‖ are mutually exclusive—either something is one (and not
many) or many (and not one). This is the Flatland
version of ―the one and the many.‖ But there is another
dimension of the one and the many that seems paradoxical because it is one and many at the same time. If, instead of either one or many, we hold both together, we
can come to the experience of an intuitive perception in
which we see intensively instead of extensively. We see
intuitively in another dimension, which is the intensive
dimension of ―multiplicity in unity‖ instead of the extensive dimension of many separate ones.
For example, when a hologram is broken into parts,
each part projects the same image as the whole hologram, though with less clarity. There is not one and another one, but one and the other of the one. ―Multiplicity in unity‖ means that there can be multiplicity within
unity without fragmenting the unity because each is the
very same one and not another one [7]. The hologram
and other examples—e.g., vegetative propagation—can
become ―templates for thinking‖ intensively as well as
extensively [8]. By visualizing these examples, one can
practice shifting from the extensive to the intensive dimension of the ―the one and the many‖ and back again.
I emphasize this intuitive practice of seeing what
appears paradoxical to ―the logic of solid bodies‖ be-

I
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cause the possibility is largely overlooked in educational practices today. Examples of the need for this
kind of thinking abound. The intensive dimension
of ―the one and the many‖ is essential for understanding Goethe‘s notion of plant metamorphosis
―by which one and the same organ presents itself to
us in manifold forms‖ [9]. Similarly, we find that in
the unity of organic nature the diversity is the unity.
his paradoxical form of ―the one and the
many‖ is also found in the philosophy of
hermeneutics, which is concerned with the
phenomenon of understanding written and artistic
works—paintings, music, theater, and so forth. Here
also we find a kind of intensive distinction, which
seems to be characteristic of the phenomenon of
something coming into expression—e.g., a work
and its presentation, expressive language, and interpretation. Whatever the expressive medium, we find
what Gadamer refers to as ―a distinction that is not
really a distinction at all.‖ In other words, there is a
paradoxical distinction that is difficult to grasp, so
one instead readily falls into dualism. What kind of
distinction is a distinction that is not a distinction? It
is an intensive distinction that takes the form of neither one nor two and at the same time both one and
two. We need to think in a way that does not separate into two but at the same time does not collapse
into one.
We can develop this capacity by philosophical
work, but it‘s a bit like trying to walk along a tightrope—most of the time we fall off on one side or
the other. For example, in the case of language and
meaning, we either ―separate into two‖ and think of
the meaning as already formed. Or we assume
meaning to be a function of words—i.e., we ―collapse into one‖—and think of meaning as simply
being produced by the words. Both misrepresent the
lived experience of expression, which is preseparation and for which the distinction between
language and meaning is intensive. When we do
glimpse this intuitively, it seems so simple—and
then we fall off the tightrope again.
A key point to realize is that lived experience—
i.e. experience as lived—always seems paradoxical
to the way in which we think of experience after it
has been lived—which is the basis for the ―common
sense‖ description of experience that seems so ―ob-

T

vious‖ but misleads us. A very clear example of this is
seen in the phenomenon of expressive behavior, where
we usually either fall into mind-body dualism or reductionist behaviorism. Wittgenstein shows us the intensive distinction that enables behavior itself to be expressive without any need for meaning to be added extensively.

W

hen it comes to science, paradox is to be expected. Think of light in the special theory of
relativity. It is a consequence of the universal
constancy of the measured speed of light that light itself
is not subject to the space-time separation characteristic
of material bodies. If, for example, we consider the distant star Betelgeuse, some 240 light years from us, for
light there is no separation between the star and our
eye. Light itself is before separation, and it is a consequence of the null-interval that the universe for light is
an intensive point including all within itself.
To the logic of solid bodies, for which separability
is a defining characteristic, such non-separability is
highly paradoxical. But imagine a being of light. For
such a light-being, the world of bodies would be impossible to imagine, and the idea of separability would be
highly paradoxical. If we say, therefore, that the behavior of light is paradoxical, we should not imagine that
this paradoxicality is somehow intrinsic to light itself.
In whatever form it takes, non-separability will always seem paradoxical to us in the world of bodies
where separability is the major taken-for-granted quality. In quantum mechanics, the superposition of states
indicates that paths separable for us (e.g., for the photon
in an interferometer) are non-separable for the photon.
The behavior of a single indivisible photon seems paradoxical to us, but it is not paradoxical to the photon.
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A

bout a year ago, I reported on my initial
experience with urban design in downtown Toronto [1]. A developer proposed
twin 58-story condominium towers ten
meters from the study window of my condominium.
This was downtown Toronto in the midst of a condo
boom that‘s continuing. My early reaction was
strongly negative, but I recognized that a NIMBY
(―Not In My Back Yard‖) response was unlikely to
carry much weight. I turned to urban design and reported on my early experience.
More than a year has passed. Much has
changed and the towers have yet to be either approved or withdrawn. I feel that I‘ve gained a much
better appreciation for the local planning process. It
may be unwise to generalize from one major North
American city in the midst of an almost unprecedented condo building boom, but some of the insights gained may be of value elsewhere. It‘s that
hope which informs this essay.
A bit about the Toronto planning situation may
help set the stage. In the early 2000s, Ontario decided to confront urban sprawl and published Places to
Grow in 2006, a document it has continued to update [2]. A greenbelt was established around Toronto. New development was discouraged in established neighborhoods and outside the greenbelt but
encouraged along major transportation corridors.
In practice, this document has stimulated condominium development along these major corridors,
including Yonge Street. A race has begun to construct as many downtown condos as possible, particularly the construction of ―glass brutalism‖—

dense, relatively inexpensive, high-rise structures offering attractive views, at least initially until some
newer construction visually interferes.
It was just such ―glass brutalism‖ development

―Glass brutalism‖ on Toronto‘s Yonge Street, two blocks from
similar proposed towers that would be ten meters away from
the author's study window. Photo: Robert Fabian.
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All these plans and
guidelines are colored by the
Ontario Municipal Board,
which has considerable power to overturn any of the
city‘s planning decisions.
This board is a quasi-legal
body whose decisions cannot
be appealed, except on the
narrowest of grounds. The
board only recognizes ―experts‖ as having opinions that
warrant serious consideration. Developers have a big
edge in this regard because
they employ the vast majority
of the individuals whom the
OMB recognizes as ―experts.‖
Against
this
proA typical block on Yonge Street. The nineteenth-century buildings are protected by heritage legdevelopment bias, how are
islation but only to a limited lot depth. Photo: Robert Fabian.
alternate concerns given
voice? The city did run something they called a ―chaproposed for outside my window. Centrally located
rette,‖ which I attended. Unfortunately, this event was
on Toronto‘s busy Yonge Street between the main
a pale imitation of an intense, several-day interactive
downtown ―epicenters,‖ the two towers would literally be on top of the main north-south Toronto subdesign process. The charette lasted less than a day. Atway line. The developer‘s argument was clear, and
tendees were given the opportunity to describe our
strong. I hoped to identify forces that could be arviews on pre-defined topics. The first feedback came
rayed to moderate this rampant commercialism and
months later and consisted of ―them‖ telling ―us‖ what
to bring some contextual sensitivity to the design.
they heard. There was no sense of an interactive, incremental, or iterative design process [3].
Our local Councilor did initiate two working
A Missing Vision
groups,
one to consider the North Downtown Yonge
Toronto does have an Official Plan, but it's very
Street Planning Framework; the other to consider the
broad brush. The city also has Tall Buildings guidedevelopment proposed outside my study window. I
lines, but their initial version left my portion of the
was a member of both working groups. What I notice
city ―blank.‖ I've been told that this was a political
is that non-experts have what I would call a ―contextucompromise allowing the other guidelines to be
al problem.‖ We don't have the established expertise to
adopted—a plausible explanation. As I became
be allowed to argue from our best understanding of the
more involved with the situation, I learned that upcontext.
dated versions of both the Official Plan and the Tall
What‘s missing was a ―vision‖ for our Toronto
Buildings guidelines were in development. As a redistrict—specifically,
for North Downtown‘s stretch of
sult of the condo towers proposed outside my winYonge Street. This thoroughfare was the first street in
dow, there was official recognition for the need of a
Ontario and Canada‘s longest—some 1,800 km. Yonge
master plan specifically addressing my part of the
was Toronto‘s main commercial street by the late ninecity. A North Downtown Yonge Street Planning
teenth century, and there are many remaining buildings
Framework is also under development.
from that era. It was Toronto‘s parade street and where
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Toronto went to celebrate. Retail functions along
―our‖ section of the street, however, have fallen on
hard times.
Less than two kilometers long, the section of
Yonge Street I‘m concerned with should aspire to
what urban designer Allan Jacobs refers to as ―Great
Street status‖ [4]. This stretch of street already has a
clearly recognized southern anchor–Dundas Square,
which is Toronto‘s Times Square [5]. The street‘s
southern portion running from Dundas Square was a
focal point of this year‘s ―Celebrate Yonge!‖ [6]
and the northern end is naturally anchored where
Yorkville Street meets Yonge [7].
If developers‘ enthusiasm for building on and
adjacent to Yonge Street could be properly harnessed, we should be able to move the street in a
good direction. To that end, the local neighborhood
associations developed a ―vision‖ for our stretch of
Yonge Street. This has the great advantage that nonexperts can reach supportable conclusions about
what makes sense for the street, and what doesn‘t.
It‘s no longer a game in which only expert opinion
counts. Explicate the context and non-experts can
meaningfully enter the game. Our ―Vision‖ has five
major elements, each of which I discuss in turn.

1. Making a “Great Street”
Yonge Street has the history and environmental possibilities to become a ―great street.‖ Drawing especially on Allan Jacobs‘ ideas, we want to see the
following place features enhanced by all new construction:








Pedestrians can walk with leisure, and users are present in
sufficient numbers for safety but with enough space that
one can walk at a comfortable pace.
The street ―walls‖ are well defined; buildings don‘t loom
over the street but do provide a definition of comfortable
containment.
At both ends, this section of Yonge has anchor ―places‖
providing a recognizable starting point and terminus that
both work as ―places‖ for people.
The street engages the eye through a rich variety of
textures, patterns, and shapes.
The building designs are complementary; they ―work‖
with each other without rote duplication.
The buildings are constructed of high-quality materials
and incorporate a high degree of craftsmanship.
Through the use of trees, plantings, and so forth, there is a
―green‖ presence along the street and at the entrances to






side streets.
There is a rich retail and recreational diversity incorporating
different kinds of shops and public spaces.
The street features ―great details‖—for example, an unusual
entry way, striking windows, or handsome benches. Great
features stand out and contribute to a distinctive
environmental ambience.
There are recognized ―places‖ along the street and adjacent to
the street. These places are destinations and locations where
pedestrians want to spend time.

2. Appropriate Design
The design of new construction is perhaps the greatest
challenge for our stretch of Yonge Street. Inappropriate
new construction significantly reduces the street‘s potential and may have a serious ripple effect across other downtown neighborhoods. Construction is not only
about profit but should also enhance the built environment for its residents and users.
One way to identify appropriate design elements is
through ―patterns‖ as described in architect Christopher Alexander‘s Pattern Language [8]. By ―patterns,‖
I mean positive design elements contributing to the life
and ambience of Yonge Street. One approach is that
new construction draw on positive patterns already
found along the street, though these patterns should be
supplemented with new patterns, provided they enhance the ―language‖ of ―great‖ design along the
street. Whether drawing on existing or new patterns,
new buildings should be harmonious with what already
exists and extend the design language in positively distinguishing ways.

3. Enhanced Public Realm
The public realm along my stretch of Yonge Street includes the street itself as well as side streets and parallel alleys, or ―laneways‖ as we call them in Canada.
There are a few small, linear parks above some of the
Yonge Street subway, and there is hope for a major
park just off Yonge Street at 11 Wellesley West. It is
the street, side streets, and laneways, however, that are
the most critically important elements in the public
realm.
A key issue is that the foot traffic on Yonge continues to increase, and there are many more pedestrians
than motorists. This pedestrian volume is sure to increase even more as thousands of new condo units require access to the street. To deal with these additional
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users, we need to recognize Yonge as a place for
pedestrians and cyclists as well as for motorists.
Because of the added foot traffic, more of the street
needs to be accessible to pedestrians. During this
past summer‘s ―Celebrate Yonge!‖ one traffic lane
of the street was opened to pedestrians, and this
successful shift demonstrates that at least one vehicle lane could be given over to pedestrians.
But raw space is not the most important factor.
Along too much of Yonge, there is little green presence. The adjacent neighborhood association
demonstrated what‘s possible with their Bay Street
bioswale project, comprised of handsome planted
―troughs‖ that capture and clean surface runoff. If
sidewalks were widened, a portion of the new space
could be devoted to a bioswale running along our
stretch of Yonge.
The laneways on either side of Yonge Street are
currently unattractive and under-utilized. Several
cities—Melbourne is one striking example [9]—
have retrofitted their laneways to provide interesting
and inviting pedestrian-friendly retail environments.
Improving Yonge‘s laneways would enhance the
retail environment and contribute to an invigorated
public realm.

4. Innovative Retail

Yonge Street‘s retail functions have been troubled for
some time. There are relatively few long-standing
businesses and, instead, many ―opportunistic‖ retail
outlets—cash stores, beauty parlors, tattoo emporiums,
sex shops, and so forth. On the other hand, pedestrian
volume is high and continues to increase as new residents occupy condominiums. Street violence is low.
Yonge Street is the central pedestrian corridor in downtown Toronto and should support a better mix of retail.
Several undermining economic factors are at
work. Real-estate land values have reached unsustainable levels—an acre of land on or near Yonge Street
now fetches 50 million dollars or more. To keep pace,
rents and property taxes increase. At the same time,
traditional retail businesses are challenged by the internet, global brands, and big-box discount pricing.
Providing ever more expensive space for large-scale
retail is unlikely to generate strong, vibrant retail.
If no special provisions are made for Yonge Street,
there is little reason to be optimistic about its retail future. This poses a fundamental challenge because vibrant, successful retail must be an essential element in
an attractive, walkable Yonge Street. Though there is
considerable developer interest in the street, most specialize in condominiums
and have little experience
in including space that can
house the kind of retail
necessary to make Yonge
commercially successful.
New York City faced a
similar challenge on its
―Upper West Side Neighborhood Retail Streets.‖ In
June, 2012, city officials
established revised zoning
restrictions relating to new
construction and building
expansion on the neighborhood‘s retail streets.
This approach might provide a model for retail development on Yonge,
which is already recogOne block of the 2012 summer event, ―Celebrate Yonge!‖ Photo: Robert Fabian.
nized as a ―special character street.‖ Possibilities
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include:




A maximum store-front width, at least for a significant
fraction of any new or rehabilitated buildings;
A minimum store-window exposure, including minimum
vertical and horizontal dimensions;
A minimum percentage of retail space to accommodate
bars and eateries and including kitchen-ventilation
systems (which, in high-rise buildings, are often difficult
to retrofit).

Relatively narrow store fronts attract the eye
and invite pedestrians to advance along the street.
Large windows encourage window displays that
engage the eye and animate the street. Restaurant
accommodation is to preserve Yonge as an attractive
dining district. Also useful would be financial incentives that encourage retail innovation, at least
until our stretch of Yonge comes to be recognized as
a ―pedestrian retail destination.‖
Yonge Street will not draw much automobile
traffic to its retail functions because parking is difficult and expensive. Instead, the street should become one of the important pedestrian destination for
Toronto retail. Three financial provisions that might
help this happen are, first, requiring that a portion of
new or enhanced retail be reserved for start-up or
new retail ventures; second, placing these ventures
in less costly locations—e.g., along laneways or in
special-kiosk retail areas; and, third, offering subsidies to freeze rents and taxes at pre-newdevelopment levels.

5. Necessary Limits
―Necessary limits‖ refer to stipulations relating to
building height and residential protections. If a new
building steps back from the Yonge Street property
line no more than 10 meters, it should not be allowed to rise more than 50 meters above the building‘s podium, which should be limited to three stories or fourteen meters. For buildings with deeper
step back, heights could be greater. Most broadly,
new-building height should be limited to five times
the step back, plus the fourteen-meter podium
height. This requirement would, in most instances,
place a twenty-story limit on buildings that step
back only ten meters and a 35-story limit on buildings that step back 20 meters. The goal would be
providing enough height to make some new devel-

opment profitable but respect the street experience of
residents and pedestrians.
Especially important in regard to residential
neighbors is requiring a minimal horizontal separation
between new buildings and the windows of any existing residential units. The city already recognizes the
importance of a 25-meter separation between residential towers, and a horizontal separation of at least 12.5
meters would be appropriate and require a setback of
6.25 meters on either side of the logical line separating
the old from the new. That marker would be the property line if the two properties were immediately adjacent, or the center of any laneway separating the two
properties.

Making Progress
The Yonge Street vision I‘ve laid out here has made
significant headway. The neighborhood associations on
both sides of our stretch of Yonge Street have endorsed
the vision, which appears with few alterations in the
draft version of the forthcoming North Downtown
Yonge Street Planning Framework. Partly because of
our vision statement, a review panel of experts concluded that a redesign was necessary for the condominium proposed near my study window. At this point, the
Ontario Municipal Board has not delivered their review of the Yonge Street document, but the signs all
point to a distinctly better building outside my window.
The current proposal is for a 52-story tower and a 22story tower rather than the original twin 58-story structures. Just as importantly, Toronto is closer to a design
and planning vision that moves Yonge Street in the
right direction.
This process has taken more than a year and is still
incomplete. It is troubling that getting this far required
a considerable amount of dedicated work for which too
few local residents have time. Fortunately, there are
several of us who are retired or semi-retired. We have
the leisure to attend meetings and draft position papers.
This advocacy process, however, should not depend on
unpaid volunteers. Even if the resources were not
available to mount a full charette, that's hardly the only
evaluative and envisioning instrument that the city and
province might provide.
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A Better Planning Process
In advocating for a better Yonge Street, I have found
that one promising approach is ―Open Space Technology,‖ which lays out the elements, processes, and
stages whereby a committed group of individuals can
explore and find solutions for a particular problem—
in the present case, providing a proposal for a better
Yonge Street [10]. Groups as small as a dozen or
larger than one thousand have successfully undertaken an Open Space Technology conference. There is,
however, one critical pre-condition in that sponsors
must be prepared to accept whatever emerges from
their work. This approach to problem-solving is different from charettes, which have the ―virtue‖ that
planners and architects are in control. There is ongoing dialogue between charette participants and experts, but the latter ultimately make final decisions.
Open Space Technology conferences are driven by
the passion and commitment of those who choose to
participate. The ―experts‖ do not have the last word.
I‘m not arguing here for an Open Space Technology conference per se. Rather, I‘m arguing that we
need alternatives to traditional planning. I find strong
parallels with the planning process for systems (my
professional work before retirement). Traditionally,
systems were planned by experts—i.e., system analysts—who develop extensive requirements and specifications that are then agreed to by users. The programmers would then proceed to build a system incorporating those requirements and specifications. All
too often the result is much less than optimal because
the system confronts the ―uncertainty principle for
systems‖ [11].
What‘s required is an iterative, incremental approach. As the stakeholders begin to see the emerging
system, they develop a much better understanding of
what the system should do and how that doing can be
actualized. The same dynamic seems to be at work in
urban planning.
Actually, the situation is worse in urban planning. The stakeholders often can't really understand
what should be in the plan before they see what's being proposed for the plan. That's a central element in
the justification for a conventional charette. There is a
growing body of social-science research that exam-

ines alternative interactive, iterative approaches [12].
Open Space Technology is not the only alternative, but it
does seem particularly appropriate to the urban planning
process—specifically, to the process of developing a vision for a city district like our stretch of Yonge Street.
Getting the plan right is challenging, and uncertainty is still possible. Our built forms require flexibility so that incremental adjustments can be made in
practice [13]. One of my concerns is that the engineering and the ownership structure of our new condo towers will make any incremental improvements and additions extremely difficult. Professionals and citizens
have found creative ways to repurpose many older
buildings but will the same be possible for the new
condo towers? An answer is far from certain.
My learning process began in May, 201l—the
month the developer announced his intention to construct the condo towers outside my window. I've come
a considerable distance. I almost understand how planning works and doesn't work in downtown Toronto. I
can see traces of my handiwork in the planning now
proposed for my stretch of Yonge Street. For me, that‘s
an attractive start.

Notes
1. R. Fabian, ―Discovering Urban Design,‖ Environmental and
Architectural Phenomenology, vol. 23, no. 1 (2011), pp. 4–6.
2. www.placestogrow.ca.
3. On the charette process, see the National Charette Institute
website at: www.charetteinstitute.org/
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5. www.ydsquare.ca/web/
6. www.celebrateyonge.com/
7. www.bloor-yorkville.com/
8. C. Alexander, S. Ishikawa, & M. Silverstein, A Pattern Language, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977.
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A Virtual Conversation
J. Kevin Byrne with Annie Mok
Byrne is a Professor of Visualization at the Minneapolis College of Art and Design. Mok is
an illustrator and cartoonist.
Byrne writes: ―EAP readers
might like a look at a ‗comic
art‘ interpretation that brings
together philosopher Martin
Heidegger, environmental
sculptor Kinji Akagawa, designer Herbert Bayer, the Dalai Lama, and me in a virtual
conversation on a hilltop in
Aspen, Colorado. This cartoon
ends a bit like a ‗Star Trek‘ episode in which characters on
the spaceship Enterprise‘s ‗holodeck‘ are set to a ‗permanent
loop‘ inside the ship‘s computer
flash drive. Like that episode, I
tried to give this cartoon a
slight feeling of dénouement….‖ kbyrne@mcad.edu;
http://anniemakesstories.com.
Images and text © 2011, 2013,
J. Kevin Byrne. For more on
Byrne‘s work, go to:
www.mnartists.org/article.do?rid=284362.
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One key concern of EAP is design, education, and policy supporting and enhancing natural and built environments that are
beautiful, alive, and humane. Realizing that a clear conceptual
stance is integral to informed research and design, the editors
emphasize phenomenological approaches but also cover other
styles of qualitative research.

Exemplary themes








Sense of place;
Architectural and landscape meaning;
Changing conceptions of space, place, and nature;
Home, dwelling, and journey;
The nature of environmental and architectural experience;
Environmental design as place making;
The practice of a lived environmental ethic.
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